[Vol. 7:59 culpation between private contracting parties violates no vital policy factors, 5 the underlying theory of the dissent in the instant case appears, nevertheless, to be founded upon historic abhorrence of attempts to limit liability for negligent acts and would, accordingly, require strict construction of such provisions.
Where exculpatory language is dear and unequivocal, there is no room for construction, and the instrument itself should be solely determinative; but where, as in the Phil-Mar case, the contract is ambiguous, it would seem that resort must be had to circumstances surrounding the transaction and to the commercial background of the contract in order to determine the true intent of the parties. In cases, for example, where the premises are not insured against loss by fire, 0 the landlord must, of necessity, look only to the common-law liability of the tenant for recovery of his loss, and in the absence of incontrovertible language to the contrary, it is highly unlikely that the landlord would be said to have intended by the exceptions in the surrender covenant, to foreswear this avenue of recovery. On the other hand, this inference is not so dear in cases where the premises are insured. In as much as the normal fire insurance policy contains subrogation provisions, 7 § 408 (1947) the release by the insured of a possible tortfeasor without consent of the insurer might well jeopardize the right of the insured to recover on the policy, 8 or render the insured liable in damages to the insurer to the extent of the insurer's consequent loss. 9 Accordingly, if a like result were ascribed to the release of a potential tortfeasor prior to any loss, it could reasonably be inferred that the lessor did not intend to exculpate the tenant at the expense of forfeiting fiis right to recovery on the policy. Nevertheless, a well recognized judicial reluctance to allow technical language to work a forfeiture of insurance 0 makes such a result unlikely in the absence of a dear policy provision to that effect; and since fire insurance policies are generally standardized as to form,"i such a provision would, indeed, be rare. Thus, it appears that while examination of the legal effects of equivocal exculpatory clauses may afford some indicia of the intent of the parties, where insurance is involved, without other supportive elements, this alone will be inconclusive.
More apposite criteria are found in cases where the courts have recognized the economic reality that, irrespective of special provision, the tenant actually pays, as additional rent, the premium cost and should, therefore, be entitled to the benefit of the insurance." Should it be 8 VANCE, INSURANCE § 134(c) 
E.zd 330 (z956).
In reference to the standard fire policy, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated: "They [the words of the subrogation clause] are inserted in the policy, not by the company or by the plaintiff, but by the statute. To fail to give them force and effect is to nullify the ' Some courts allow the insurer to be reimbursed out of the amount received, less costs of recovery to the insured, up to the full amount paid by the insurer; others limit reimbursement to that amount by which the money received from the wrongdoer, together with the insurance, exceeds the loss and cost of recovery incurred by the insured. 29 (1913) , the policy contained a stipulation for subrogation and the insured had, by contract prior to the loss, specifically released the tortfeasor from liability. The court held that such a stipulation in the policy could only work a forfeiture strictissimi juris; that stipulation being inserted in the policy by the insurer for his own protection would be construed most strongly against him and in favor of the insured. See 29 AM. JuR., Insurance § 166. denied him, he would be forced, in order to protect himself, to insure the premises a second time-at best, an uneconomical procedure." Furthermore, although the idea is strongly opposed by insurance companies, subrogation may more accurately be considered a windfall to the insurer than an inherent right. 4 For although it is true that at common law subrogation is allowed an insurer after payment of the loss, even without a stipulation to that effect in the policy, 5 the fact remains that the insurer is paid to assume the risk of loss, and its premium rates are established accordingly.'" The standard fire insurance policy covers fires caused by negligence as well as those caused by accident or natural causes,' 7 and premium rates are calculated on the frequency of occurrence of all three types, without regard to subrogation rights.' Accordingly, there is a perceptibly growing leniency displayed toward the negligent lessee. That this trend is not unopposed, however, is indicated by numerous dissents;' 9 and at least one state has insisted, that an it was contemplated that the lessor. would carry insurance on the property and look to the insurance for compensation for any loss by fire." United States Fire Ins. Co. v. 'aIn Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 7 1ll.2d 393, 398, 131 N.E.2d 00o, 103 (19SS) the court says: "Under the construction urged by the lessor it would be necessary for both parties to the lease to carry fire insurance if they are to be protected. The lessee would have to insure against fires due to his negligence, and the lessor against fires due to other causes. Whether the kind of policy the lessee would have needed was commercially available when the present lease was entered into is at least dubious." 1 "The insurance rate on a building, according to insurance authorities, is a reasonably accurate reflection of the loss probabilities of that particular class of property." NOLTING, How MUNICIPAL FIRE DEFENSES AFFECT INSURANCE RATES 50 (1939)5 "The two systems in most common use for schedule rating are the Universal Mercantile Schedule and the Analytic Schedule. A third system, which undertakes to incorporate the element of experience, is known as the Experience Grading and Rating Schedule. This last system has never been actually adopted for use and is, therefore, of little, practical concern." MAGEE, GENERAL INSURANCE ( 4 th ed. 
Am

1957)
NOTES intention on the part of the landlord to relieve a tenant from liability for negligent damage to insured premises can never be inferred from equivocal language 2 0
In the final analysis, it becomes clear that the contemporary trend evinces an approach more in keeping with the probable intent of the parties and the economic realities of the situation than did earlier cases. Nevertheless, as long as some courts adhere to a purely semantic construction of exculpatory provisions, it will be necessary for lessors and lessees to adopt self-help measures. The most obvious of these is, of course, a specific exception of negligently caused fire damage in the surrender covenant. 2 1 A more practical device, however, would be that of including both landlord and tenant as named insureds "as their interests may appear 2 2 With subrogation against the tenant thus obviated, a cover-all exception in the surrender covenant would not be objectionable to the insurer, and by this means, the tenant could block recovery by the landlord for fire losses in excess of the insurance coverage.
This latter sugge~tion presupposes either willing cooperation between landlord and tenant, or at least an equality of bargaining power. Where, however, the relationship between the parties is not on such a plane, essentially the same result may be had if the lessee covenants to insure the property for the lessor's benefit and secures an agreed amount and type of coverage in his own name. 23 If the lessor is able to dictate terms under which the lessee assumes full responsibility for " "Contracts for exemption from liability for negligence are not favored by the law, and are strictly construed against the party asserting it. The contract will never be so interpreted in the absence of clear and specific words that such was the intent of the parties." Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co., 238 N. C. 589, 596, 79 S.E.zd
185, 19o (1953)0
2A normal inspection of the risk would doubtless include an examination of the terms of the lease, and such a provision would be likely to cause objection by the insurer. Further, insertion of such a clause in a lease drawn after the issuance of the policy would be derogatory to the rights of the insured. The analogy of the insurer to a surety is drawn in 6 VAND. L. 3 "And a tenant who has agreed verbally to keep the demised property insured is liable to the lessor for a breach of that agreement, and has an insurable interest in the property to the extent of the amount agreed to be insured." Berry v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 13z N.Y. 49, 56, 3 a N.E. 254, 255 (1892).
